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WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS PAST
RECORD AND FUTURE PROMISE
by Representative Clement J Zablocki Chairman, House Committee on ForeignAffairs*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review is to be commended for
sponsoring this symposium on the War Powers Resolution (WPR).
November 7, 1983 marked the tenth anniversary of the enactment of
the Resolution over the President's veto. The continuing significance
of the Resolution was demonstrated by the fact that only six days
before that anniversary, the House passed, by a vote of 403-23, a joint
resolution invoking the provisions of the War Powers Resolution with
respect to United States military action in Grenada.'
The sequence of events leading to its formulation, and the political
dynamics surrounding its passage have been adequately dealt with
elsewhere.2 Accordingly, the main focus of this article concerns the implemeiitation of the Resolution during its ten year history by the Executive and the Congress.
This discussion of WPR implementation is divided between executive-legislative implementation under the Ford and Carter Administrations, and implementation under the Reagan Administration. The
principal reason for this division is that the clearest applications of the
Resolution, and the clearest challenges to its effectiveness, have occurred as a result of decisions by the Reagan Administration to commit
troops into Lebanon and Grenada. The Ford and Carter Administrations did not engage in such clear-cut military actions on a major scale.
* Ph. B. 1936, Marquette University; Wisconsin State Senator 1942-48; United States

Representative 1948-83. Co-author of the War Powers Resolution, the Honorable Clement
J. Zablocki passed away on December 3, 1983, after having approved this article for publication by the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
1. H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H8933-34 (daily ed. Nov. 1,

1983).
2. See

STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT

A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMMITTEE
103-10 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN STUDY].

ON THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
AFFAIRS,

ON FOREIGN
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AND CARTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION

The political embarrassment of a veto override and the resistance
to share war powers responsibilities that had been virtually conceded to
Presidents by Congress after World War II, made the executive branch
slow to establish procedures for WPR implementation in the first year
after passage. In fact, it was not until October 1974 that the State Department established procedures for compliance. Furthermore, those
procedures were established only after a letter to the Secretary of State
from the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1974, inquiring as to
"what arrangements have been made within the Executive branch to
ensure full and timely compliance." 3
Executive branch implementation was only marginally better during the series of tests of compliance during the 1974-1980 period.4 A
short discussion of these tests follows.
A.

DanangSealft

President Ford's use of United States military aircraft to evacuate
American citizens and Vietnamese refugees during the collapse of

South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 was the first test of WPR compliance. This test concerned two sections of the War Powers Resolution.

First, the sealift tested section 3 which requires the President to consult
with Congress in every possible instance before introducing United

States Armed Forces into hostilities or into imminent involvement in
3. Letter from Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State (July 16, 1974), reprintedinSTAFF OF HOUSE SunCOMM. ON INT'L SECURITY & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEsS., THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DocU-

MENTS, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS 37 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS].

4. For other incidents which raised possible questions among members of Congress
concerning WPR applicability, see infra notes 5-20 and accompanying text. These incidents
include: the unarmed military evacuation of Americans from Cyprus in July 1974, food and
military equipmenf resupply of Cambodia by unarmed military aircraft in the summer of
1974, unarmed reconnaissance fights over Cambodia in late 1974 and early 1975, unarmed
military evacuation of Americans from Lebanon in June 1976, the deployment of 300
United States troops under the United Nations flag into the demilitarized zone in Korea
after the North Korean attack on United States and South Korean soldiers attempting to cut
down a tree in the zone in August 1976, the airlift of military equipment to Zaire in May
1978, and the participation of United States troops in joint military maneuvers with Honduras throughout 1982 and 1983. See also SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 173-77, 221-37.
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hostilities. 5 Second, Ford's act concerned section 4 which requires the
President to report to Congress whenever United States Armed Forces
are introduced (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while
equipped for combat (with certain exceptions); and (3) in numbers
which substantially enlarge United States armed forces equipped for
combat already located in a foreign nation.6
The reporting requirement of section 4 is the essential element of
the War Powers Resolution. If the President files a report under the
first circumstance listed above (section 4(a)(1)), United States troops
must be removed within sixty days unless Congress, under section 5(b)
of the Resolution, extends their presence by authorization or declaration of war. Through the reporting requirement, Congress thus
reserves for itself the exercise of the mandate provided exclusively to
Congress by the Constitution on the final decision on committing
troops into war.
As such, the Danang sealift represented the first of several initial
tests of executive branch compliancewith the War Powers Resolution.
More importantly, it provided an indication of whether the executive
branch would acknowledge the constitutional validity of the Resolution or rely on claims of executive power of the Commander-in-Chief
to justify its actions.
Post World War II Presidents have used the phrase "Commanderin-Chief' to justify waging wars without congressional approval. Its
usage has also been part of a myth about the constitutional importance
of the Commander-in-Chief.
The notion that the President can decide whether or not to seek
congressional approval for committing troops is not evident in the Constitution or in the statements of the founding fathers. The fact that
executive branch lawyers say there is such evidence does not give it
constitutional foundation.
While some of the Founding Fathers were concerned about this
issue, James Madison commented that the executive has no right, in
any case, to decide whether there is cause for declaring war.7 Madison
added that the power of judging the causes of war rests exclusively with
5. War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 3, 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1976).

6. Id. § 4, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
7. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 41, 48 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In Federalist No. 41, id. at 276, Madison implicitly refers to the Federalist Papers of Hamilton in which
Hamilton unequivocally states that the legislative branch, not the executive branch, has the
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the legislative branch. In short, there is nothing vague or amorphous
about who receives the vast bulk of war powers under the Constitution.
It is Congress.
Executive branch compliance concerning the Danang sealift was
disappointing at best. Rather than seeking Congress' views beforehand, legislative "consultation" involved reporting the President's decisions to various members of Congress, thereby constituting nothing
more than after-the-fact information. The executive branch's report to
Congress cited the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief as the
legal authority under which the sealift was undertaken and the report
failed to specifically cite any of the three subsections of section 4 as the
basis for the report.8 This method of compliance, which avoided the
triggering of section 5(b), set in motion a pattern of half-hearted executive branch compliance with the War Powers Resolution which has
persisted to this day. This attitude has also frustrated the development
of a collective judgment by Congress and the President on the decision
to commit troops to hostilities or to imminent involvement in hostilities
that motivated the authors of the Resolution, and is reflected in section
2(a) of the Resolution.
B.

Cambodian Evacuation

The evacuation of Americans and Cambodians from Phnom Penh
in April 1975 by United States military aircraft also involved deficient
compliance with sections 3 and 4. Consultation once again more accurately resembled information about a decision that had already been
taken by the President. Furthermore, attempts by members of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations to discuss evacuation plans for Phnom Penh in the
weeks preceding the actual evacuation were rebuffed by the State Department, ignoring the provisions of section 3.9 The report to Congress
"took note of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution," 10 disregarding
the requirement to report under section 4(a)(1) and avoiding the requirements of that section.
exclusive power to decide whether the United States should enter a war. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 153 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
8. Report from the President of the United States to the Hon. Carl Albert, Speaker of
the House, Compliance with Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (Apr. 4, 1975),
reprintedin RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 40-41.
9. See SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 188.
10. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON EVACUATION OF UNITED STATES
NATIONALS FROM CAMBODIA, H.R. DOC. No. 105, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprintedin
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 42.
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C. Saigon Evacuation
The final evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese in Saigon by
United States military aircraft in late April 1975 also involved sections
3 and 4. In this instance, consultation was extensive, but took place in
the context of President Ford's legislative request submitted earlier in
the month for authority to evacuate United States and Vietnamese nationals in the event South Vietnam collapsed, notwithstanding existing
legal prohibitions on the use of American forces in Southeast Asia.
Congress failed to provide such authority, and President Ford relied on
Commander-in-Chief powers to authorize the evacuation. As a result,
the failure of Congress to enact special legislative authority seemed to
compromise its power in the commission of troops through joint legislative-executive action, thereby undermining full WPR compliance.
The report to Congress followed the pattern of the first two reports and
only "took note" of section 4. Even the most charitable of congressional observers in 1975 could only give the executive branch mixed
marks for its compliance and some regarded it as "questionable in law
and unsatisfactory.""
D.

Mayaguez Incident

President Ford's effort to rescue Americans on the United States
freighter Mayaguez captured by the Khmer Communist forces in international waters on May 12-15, 1975, raised section 3 and 4 questions.
Consultation with Congress occurred after the fact and involved informing about twenty congressional leaders by telephone and briefings
for relevant congressional committees. 2 Following past procedure, the
report failed to cite any specific parts of section 4 and relied on Commander-in-Chief powers for authority.'" Nonetheless, the report did
take "note of section 4(a)(1)" for the first time, suggesting that congressional authorization for United States military activities in Cambodia
would have been required if the operation had lasted more than sixty
4
days.'
11. War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of
Phnom Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident, 1975: Hearings Before

Subcomm. on Int'l Security & Scient#Fc Affairs ofthe House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. 69 (1975) (statement of Senator Jacob Javits, Ranking Minority Member,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee) [hereinafter cited as Compliance Hearings].
12. For a detailed description of the congressional consultations during the Mayaguez
incident, see SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 208-20.
13. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE S.S.
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

14. Id. at 1.

MAYAGUEZ, S.

Doc. No. 56, 94th
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More disturbing, however, was a statement submitted for the record during hearings held in May and June 1975 by the Subcommittee
on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, by Monroe Leigh, the State Department's legal adviser. Leigh, in responding to a congressional inquiry,
cited six circumstances in which he claimed that the President had inherent constitutional authority to commit American forces into hostilities other than the three cases specified in section 2(c) of the War
Powers Resolution (declaration of war, specific statutory authorization,
and national emergency created by an attack upon the United States,
its territories, possessions or armed forces). 5 The six circumstances
were (1) to rescue American citizens abroad; (2) to rescue foreign nationals where such action directly facilitates the rescue of United States
citizens abroad; (3) to protect American Embassies and legations
abroad; (4) to suppress civil insurrection in the United States; (5) to
implement and administer the terms of an armistice or cease-fire
designed to terminate hostilities involving the United States; and (6)6 to
carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties.1
This expansive definition of presidential authority stood in stark
contrast to the tightly drawn definition fo section 2(c). Furthermore,
item six directly contradicted section 8(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution which stated that authority to commit United States troops into
hostilities "shall not be inferred from any treaty. . . unless such treaty
is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .", The Leigh
memorandum demonstrated that half-hearted compliance with the
War Powers Resolution was to be accompanied by an executive branch
attitude that inherent constitutional authority enabled the Commander-in-Chief to defy the Resolution's provisions.
.

Iran Hostage Rescue Operation

President Carter's decision to use military force to rescue United
States Embassy personnel held hostage in Iran on April 25, 1980, also
involved the consultation and reporting provisions of sections 3 and 4.
Consultation with Congress in this mission was non-existent; several
attempts to obtain information about the rescue operation beforehand
15. Leigh added that the six circumstances were not exhaustive. For the full text of
Leigh's statement, see Compliance Hearings,supra note 11, at 2-40, 76-101.
16. Id.
17. War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 8(a)(2), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1976).
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were rebuffed by the Carter Administration. 8 The report was even less
specific than those of the Ford Administration. The Carter Administration merely cited "the reporting provisions of the War Powers
Resolution." 19
More troubling was the legal justification for the President's action. The President's legal adviser, Lloyd Cutler, sent a memorandum
to the House and Senate foreign affairs-related committees arguing that
the President had no requirement to consult Congress because (1) in
the first stages of the operation (the landing in the Iranian desert), no
hostilities were involved and the operation was aborted before hostilities began; (2) the President has inherent authority to conduct rescue
operations and section 8(d)(1) of the War Powers Resolution provided
that nothing in the resolution was intended to alter the President's constitutional authority; and (3) there is reasonable ground to believe that
consultation would unreasonably endanger the mission and therefore
would endanger exercise of the inherent constitutional authority recognized by section 8(d)(1). z0
The Cutler memorandum represented perhaps the most serious affront ever exercised against WPR implementation. Instead of accepting the specific exercises of Commander-in-Chief powers cited in
section 2(c), the memorandum turned logic on its head by citing the
inherent powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief (which the
authors of the Resolution never accepted). The memorandum also
used section 8(d)(1) to justify the use of inherent executive powerseven to the point of avoiding prior consultation with Congress before
committing troops. The logical extreme of the Cutler memorandum
echoed the Leigh statement in that the memorandum seemed to argue
that inherent constitutional powers enabled the President to ignore the
Resolution's requirements altogether.
Furthermore, the Cutler memorandum attempted to narrowly de18. Letter from Senator Frank Church, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Jacob Javits, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State (April 24, 1980) (recommending consultation on
possible military action to rescue hostages, written the day before the rescue mission). See
SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 241-42. Senator Henry Jackson, ranking majority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also undertook efforts to obtain information
beforehand. Id. at 242.
19. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN

THE ATTEMPTED

RESCUE OF HOSTAGES IN IRAN, H.R. Doc. No. 303, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.

1 (1980).
20. Legal Opinion of Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to President Carter, War Powers Consulta-

tion Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission (May 9, 1980), reprintedin RELEVANT
supra note 3, at 50.

DOCUMENTS,
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fine "imminent involvement in hostilities" with respect to section
4(a)(1). The landing in Iran was viewed as separate from the effort to
rescue the hostages (which was aborted). As a result, the memo did not
see the entire operation as clearly including "imminent involvement in
hostilities" from the outset. Such definitions and assertions constituted
nothing more than calculated efforts to further limit situations in which
WRP provisions were relevant.
In short, from a candidate who, in 1976, said he supported the War
Powers Resolution, President Carter had come a long way-in the
wrong direction.
F Assessment of Ford-CarterImplementation of the War Powers
Resolution
Three major points must be made about the implementation of the
War Powers Resolution under the Ford and Carter Administrations.
First, as previously stated, executive branch compliance was halfhearted at best and deliberately evasive at worst. No report was filed
pursuant to a specific subsection of section 4. Whatever grudging deference to the Resolution was implied by the fact that both Administrations provided reports which merely "took note of the War Powers
Resolution," was more than offset by the thrust of the Leigh and Cutler
memoranda. Unfortunately, those two memoranda attempted to claim
that inherent presidential powers permitted non-compliance with the
law. The Cutler memorandum breached logic completely by gratuitously citing-and erroneously misinterpreting-a provision of the
Resolution to support the doctrine of inherent presidential powers in
committing troops, a denial emphatically established in the legislative
history of the War Powers Resolution.2'
Second, Congress could have been more determined in its oversight of executive branch compliance. Hearings and briefings fell short
of establishing a strong institution-wide consensus on the adequacy of
WRP compliance or what procedures should be established to regularize consultations under section 3 and force more specific compliance
with the reporting requirements of section 4.
The principal reason for this inadequate oversight lies in the political dynamics surrounding the various tests of compliance. Each case
involved the safety of Americans and the military actions were evacuation efforts. Each action was politically popular when it was undertaken, of short duration, and involved objectives which overshadowed
21. RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 50.
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concerns about the supposed technicalities of consultation and reporting under the War Powers Resolution. Achieving congressional consensus on a political strategy for insuring executive compliance with the
War Powers Resolution is difficult enough; under circumstances of politically popular short-term rescues of American citizens, it became
impossible.
Finally, none of the tests of compliance were of the order of magnitude or duration resembling the Vietnam War, the trauma of which
had built the political foundation for passage of the War Powers Resolution. They were elementary and partial trials of the statute's effectiveness. None of the situations had serious foreign policy implications
or long-term foreign policy objectives nor did they involve conscious
efforts to deploy troops to attain such objectives. Nonetheless, the pattern of unsatisfactory executive branch compliance and somewhat
tepid congressional oversight tended to tarnish the credibility of the
Resolution. The coming to power of the Reagan Administration and
its willingness to use military forces in the Middle East and the Caribbean, however, provided the first real test of the effectiveness of the
War Powers Resolution.
III.

WAR POWERS IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION

A.

Early Challenges

The onset of the Reagan Administration brought on a number of
early challenges of WRP implementation and effectiveness. First, President Reagan's dispatch of United States military personnel to El Salvador in March 1981 led some members of Congress to question their
possible involvement or imminent involvement in hostilities under the
meaning of section 4(a)(1).
The Administration countered the belief that United States military personnel were not equipped or authorized to enter into combat.
Special precautions were also being taken to ensure American safety,
and personnel would not be permitted to go on patrol with Salvadoran
forces. The Administration further stated that Americans would only
train Salvadoran forces in areas removed from significant fighting. In
addition, after a letter from the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in March 1981,22 the Administration agreed to provide pe22. Letter from Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, to Alexander M. Haig, Secretary of State (March 6, 1981), reprintedin RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 51.
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riodic reports on instruction and guidelines governing the activities of
United States military personnel in El Salvador and the internal security situation in El Salvador and the activities of United States military
personnel. 23 Most members of Congress seemed satisfied that the Administration had acted "carefully to avoid actions that would call the
War Powers Resolution into play."'24

Nonetheless, eleven members of Congress, led by Representative
George W. Crockett, Jr., of Michigan, remained convinced of WPR
applicability and decided to file suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that the
defendants' actions violated the War Powers Resolution and a writ of
mandamus and/or injunction directing the President to remove United
States military personnel from El Salvador. 25 For the first time since
the Resolution's passage, the judiciary became involved in its
implementation.
The congressional plaintiffs alleged that (1) United States troops
had been introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated by the circumstances,
without a declaration of war or statutory authorization by Congress
and (2) United States forces had been permitted to remain in El Salvador despite the failure of the President to file a report under section
4(a)(1) and (3) United States forces had been permitted to stay beyond
the sixty day period in the absence of congressional action under the
provisions of section 5(b).26
On October 4, 1982, Judge Green of the District Court of the District of Columbia ruled that a decision by the court would be premature. The district court found that
the legislative scheme did not contemplate court-ordered
withdrawal when no report has been filed, but rather, it leaves
open the possibility for a court to order that a report be filed,
or alternatively, withdrawal 60 days after a report was filed or
required to be filed by a court or Congress.
The district court dismissed the complaint" and the court of appeals
23. Letter from Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (April
6, 1981), reprintedin RELEVANT DOCUMENTS of 1983, supra note 3, at 52-53.
24. SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 253.
25. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), afTdper curiam, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
26. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 895-96.
27. Id. at 901.
28. Id. at 903.
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affirmed the district court's decision on the same grounds. 29
In addition to the controversy over El Salvador, the Reagan Administration has reported to Congress with respect to the War Powers
Resolution on two non-controversial actions. First, in March 1982, the
President filed a report "consistent with Section 4(a)(2) of the War
Powers Resolution,"3 concerning United States participation in a multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai to implement the EgyptianIsraeli Treaty and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Since Congress had
already authorized this participation in the fall of 1981, the report engendered little controversy. Second, in August 1983, the President reported "consistent with the War Powers Resolution"'" that United
States military aircraft had been deployed in Sudan to provide reconnaissance and early warning to the Chadian government, which had
been fighting a Libyan-backed insurgency. The operation was shortterm and generated little controversy in Congress.
In June 1983 another challenge directed at WRP implementation
came not from the Reagan Administration but from the Supreme
Court. In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,3 2 the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a one-house legislative veto
was unconstitutional, basing its arguments on the expansive clauses of
bicameralism and presentment which seems to cast constitutional
33
doubts on all legislative vetoes.
To some observers, the Court's decision dealt a serious blow to the
effective implementation of the War Powers Resolution. Some argued
that it voided section 5(c), which had enabled Congress to remove
United States Armed Forces from hostilities abroad by concurrent resolution if the forces were deployed without specific statutory authorization declaring war. Since all Presidents have refused to file reports
under section 4(a)(1), which triggers the sixty day requirement of section 5(b) for congressional approval, section 5(c) was seen as the ulti29. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
30. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) DEPLOYED IN THE SINAI, H.R. Doc. No.

158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982), reprintedin RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, supra note 3, at 5759.
31. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN
LEBANON, H.R. Doc. No. 230, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982), reprintedin RELEVANT DocuMENTS, supra note 3, at 60-6 1.
32. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
33. For an analysis of INS v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), and its implications on legislative vetoes in foreign policy, see The United States Supreme Court Decision
Concerning the Legislative Veto, 1983: Hearings Before House Comm on ForeignAffairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as ChadhaHearings].
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mate congressional sanction for any military action by a President that
was defiantly taken outside the terms of the Resolution.
There are several reasons for believing these concerns are overdrawn and even unfounded. First, the separability clause in section 9
of the Resolution protects the entire Resolution from being affected by
the Chadha decision, even if section 5(c) has been cast in doubt. The
majority decision in Chadha also seemed to support the validity and
34
workability of such separability clauses generally.
Second, it is not even clear that the Chadha decision is a de facto
invalidation of the constitutionality of section 5(c). In testimony before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1983, Professor Eugene
Gressman accurately pointed out that
[i]t is very difficult, if not impossible, to expect that the courts
will ever enter into a dispute between the President and the
Congress over the procedures or the powers that Congress
may or may not delegate to the President in the foreign affairs
area.
This is a very unique field. Again, I suggest that maybe
this is one context where some of the normal legislative proce35
dural rules laid down in Chadha might not apply.
Third, under the Constitution, Congress is given the exclusive
power to commit troops into hostilities.36 Congress does not delegate
this power to the President in the War Powers Resolution. Thus, since
Congress has the exclusive power to commit troops, the outcome of the
Chadha decision does not affect the concurrent resolution provision of
the War Powers Resolution. Use of the concurrent resolution provision
in section 5(c) to reverse a troop commitment by a President who has
taken such an action without congressional approval need not meet the
presentment test of Chadha.
Finally, the cooperative spirit of the Resolution on matters of war
envisaged by its authors remains a possibility if the executive does not
exploit opportunities for its invasion. To its credit, in the aftermath of
Chadha, the Reagan Administration has pledged full cooperation in
abiding by the consultation and reporting provisions of the Resolution.
If such pledges are upheld, particularly with respect to section 4(a)(1)
34. See M. ROSENBERG, SUMMARY AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF INS V. Cl1ADJIA
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO CASE (1983), reprintedin ChadhaHearings,supra note 33, at 235-38.
35. Chadha Hearings,supra note 33, at 155.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, dl. 11-16.
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situations, confrontation over section 5(c) may be avoided until such
time as a full court test is made.
The full implications of the June 1983 Chadha decision for WPR
implementation have yet to be realized. For the moment, a position
which allows the possibility of minimal effects on section 5(c) is advisable both in terms of congressional prerogatives and executive compliance. In the meantime, the events in Lebanon two months later were to
be a far greater challenge to WPR effectiveness.
B. Lebanon and the War Powers Resolution

Direct United States military involvement in Lebanon began in
August 1982 when the Reagan Administration agreed to commit American troops to a multilateral peacekeeping force to supervise the evacuation from Beirut of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Syrian
forces. The evacuation was successful and the peacekeeping forces
were withdrawn on September 10. The September 16-18 Sabra and
Shatila refugee camp massacres and the assassination of Lebanese
President Bashir Gemayel led the Lebanese government to request reconstitution of the peacekeeping force in order "to establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out
their responsibilities in the Beirut area."37 The United States agreed to
participate and United States Marines returned to Lebanon on September 29.
From the very outset, some members of Congress were highly
skeptical of United States military participation in Lebanon. Congressional leaders were especially concerned about a possible long-term
commitment to a very difficult mission that seemed ripe for hostilities.
With specific reference to the War Powers Resolution, one month
before the initial American troop deployment in August, I wrote to the
President, stating that the conditions in Beirut "clearly meet the section
4(a)(1) test for reporting under the War Powers Resolution. '38 My article in the Washington Post on October 3, 1982, repeated the theme that
the situation clearly involved imminent involvement in hostilities and
that the President was therefore ignoring the WPR section 4(a)(1) re37. Letter from Robert Dillon, United States Ambassador to Lebanon, to Fouad Butrus,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Lebanon (Sept. 25, 1982), quoted
in S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprintedin 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1230, 1247. See also H.R.J. Res. 364, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H7593
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
38. Letter from Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, to President Ronald Reagan (July 6, 1982) (available in the files of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs).
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porting requirements. 39
For the most part, however, unlike concern for the commitment of
troops, congressional reaction to the President's compliance with the
Resolution muted. Despite some misgivings, most members believed
that once in place, the Marines should not be withdrawn hastily by
congressional action or inaction under the War Powers Resolution.
They also believed that the objectives of helping to restore order and to
facilitate a sovereign government in Lebanon were worthy. So long as
casualties were not taken, the political pressure for congressional involvement lay dormant.
This situation persisted for several months. In the early months of
operation, the peacekeeping forces including United States Marines
were perceived positively by most of Lebanon's warring factions.
In March 1983, the situation deteriorated when five Marines were
wounded in a terrorist attack. Further deterioration of the peacekeeping purpose occurred throughout the spring and summer, evidenced by
(1) the bombing of the United States Embassy in April, (2) the Syrian
refusal to accept the May 17 Israeli-Lebanese troop withdrawal agreement, and (3) intensified fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces
and Druze and Amal militias in the Shuf and Alayh districts and at
Suq-al-Gharb.
By August 1983 the security situation deteriorated even further. In
anticipation of Israeli withdrawals from the Shuf and Alayh districts,
fighting between the Druze and Christian militias, and between Druze
and Lebanese Armed Forces, resulted in the closing of the Beirut airport where the United States contingent was stationed. Caught in the
crossfire and under attack themselves, the United States forces returned
fire for the first time on August 28 and following the death of two
Marines from the Druze mortar attack.
Two more Marines were killed on September 4, and after the Israeli withdrawal from the Alayh and Shuf that same day, the Lebanese
Armed Forces moved into these areas and also occupied Suq-al-Gharb.
As attacks on American positions intensified, United States reconnaissance flights and naval gunfire were authorized. United States support
to the Lebanese Armed Forces' occupation of Suq-al-Gharb, which
overlooked Marine positions, was also authorized.
With these unavoidable actions, the original United States image
as impartial peacekeeper was seriously undermined.
39. Zablocki, Reagan is Skirting the WarPowersAct, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1982, § 2, at 7,
col. 2.
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With the deaths of the two Marines on August 28, congressional
concern quickly intensified and the President's failure to comply with
the Resolution one year earlier came back to haunt him. In rapid fashion, the President dispatched White House Chief of Staff James A.
Baker to meet with House and Senate leaders in order to gain congressional approval for United States troop deployment in Lebanon.
In the House, during the first two weeks of September, negotiations took place between myself, Baker, White House Counsel Fred
Fielding, and the Democratic leadership in the House and senior Democrats and Republicans on the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Initially,
Administration officials sought a simple joint resolution supporting the
President's actions in Lebanon and made no mention of the War Powers Resolution. The Administration knew there would be tough negotiations and major concessions over the WPR. When Speaker of the
House Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill told the Administration that the House
would not approve "another Tonkin Gulf resolution," the Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee insisted that any troop deployment be specifically authorized under the War Powers Resolution.
In mid-September an agreement was reached. A joint resolution,
introduced in the House, embodied the terms of the agreement.4 0 The
keystone of the agreement was the use of the War Powers Resolution to
authorize the United States troop presence in Lebanon. Using the
unique mechanism of section 5(b), which enables Congress as well as
the President to determine when a section 4(a)(1) situation had occurred, Congress determined that the requirements of section 4(a)(1)
became operative on August 29. Since section 4(a)(1) was triggered,
Congress then authorized the continued participation of United States
armed forces in the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon.
under H.R.J. Res. 364, however, had the followThe authorization
41
ing constraints:
(1) a limitation of 1200-1600 troops, with troop activities limited
to self-defense except for protective measures (naval, air, and artillery
support, and air reconnaissance) to ensure the safety of the MNF;
(2) a bi-monthly report to Congress on all activities and functions of the MNF;
(3) a stipulation that United States participation in the Multinational force shall be authorized for purposes of the War Powers Resolu40. H.R.J. Res. 364, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rc. H7174 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1983).
41. H.R.J. Res. 364, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rac. H7593, H7595 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1983).
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tion until the end of an eighteen month period (unless Congress
extends such authorization), and that such authorization shall terminate sooner if. (A) all foreign forces are withdrawn from Lebanon (unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that continued
United States Armed Forces participation is required after such foreign
forces withdraw up to the end of the eighteen month period in order to
establish Lebanese government control of the Beirut area); or (B) when
the United Nations representatives for Lebanon are able to assume the
responsibilities for the force; or (C) upon the implementation of other
effective security arrangements in the area; or (D) the withdrawal of all
other countries from participation in the force;
(4) a provision that nothing in the resolution precludes either the
President or Congress from directing the withdrawal of United States
forces in Lebanon and that the resolution does not modify, limit or
,upercede any provision of the War Powers Resolution of the requirement in section 4(a) of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of
1983.42 That Act requires congressional authorization of any substantial expansion in the number or role of United States armed forces in
43
Lebanon.
Opposition to H.J. Res. 364 centered on the length of its authorization (eighteen months). Efforts to reduce this period were made in both
the Committee and the House. But proponents of the Resolution argued (1) that eighteen months were needed to prevent Syria from questioning United States' resolution to maintain troops in Lebanon and
waiting out the Marine presence, (2) that the eighteen month authorization insulated the United States participation from election year politics, and (3) that if a new President were elected in 1984, his
Administration would have an opportunity to review the situation
without time pressure. 44
The arguments were persuasive. The House, on September 28, approved the resolution by a vote of 270-16 1.4 The Senate approved a
similar resolution (S.J. Res. 159) by a vote of 54-46.46 The President
signed the measure into Public Law No. 98-119 on October 12, 1983.
42. Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-43, 97 Stat. 215 (1983).
43. Id. § 4(b).
44. 129 CONG. REc. H7618-23 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
45. Id. at H7623.
46. For a full text of the House and Senate debates on the Lebanon War Powers Resolution, see 129 CONG. Ruc. S12,911-40 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983); 129 CONG. REc. S12,98313,004 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1983); 129 CONG. REc. S13,030-66, H7560-7623 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1983); 129 CONG. REc. S13,125-68 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
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C. Impact of Lebanon War Powers Resolution
The passage of the Lebanon War Powers Resolution (LWPR) represented the first formal exercise of the provisions of the War Powers
Resolution. Moreover, the fact that President Reagan signed the legislation into law represented an extremely meaningful executive branch

acceptance of the War Powers Resolution. While the President's statement at the signing attempted to reclaim Commander-in-Chief powers,47 the presidential signature speaks for itself and represents a

grudging but richer acceptance of the reality of the Resolution that previously had not existed in the executive branch. As such, the Lebanon

War Powers Resolution is a significant accomplishment.
In addition, for those who opposed the measure, the Lebanon War

Powers Resolution provided a properly ordered legislative platform for
opposition to the continued presence of United States troops in Leba-

non. Contrary to uninformed criticisms of LWPR as a "blank check to
the President," the Resolution (1) limits the functions and numbers of

United States troops, how long they may stay (including circumstances
under which they may be removed earlier), (2) fully affirms the right'of
Congress to change its judgments at a later date, and (3) requires fur-

ther congressional approval for any substantial expansion of United
States military activities.

As such, opponents of United States policy in Lebanon find that
several constraints on executive action are already in place that would
not exist without LWPR and a legislative vehicle for further changes by

amendment. Thus, the Lebanon War Powers Resolution represents a
balance of executive flexibility and congressional control which
strongly reinforces the War Powers Resolution as the best means of
achieving what (in section 2) is called "collective judgment" of the leg-

islative and executive branches on the commitment of American troops
into hostilities.
47. In signing the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, the President made the
following comment:
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state, in signing this resolution,
that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the Constitution as President and as Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces.
Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgement that the President's
constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute, that congressional authorization would be required if and when the period specified in section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution might be deemed to have been triggered and
the period had expired, or that section 6 the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be interpreted to revise the President's constitutional authority to deploy United States Armed Forces.
President's Statement on Signing S.J. Res. 159 Into Law, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1422-23 (Oct. 12, 1983).
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The positive experience of the Lebanon War Powers Resolution
created hopes that fuller implementation of the Resolution would soon
become a matter of practice in the executive branch. Unfortunately,
the United States military action in Grenada severely dashed those
hopes.
D. Grenada and the War Powers Resolution

President Reagan's compliance with the War Powers Resolution
regarding the invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, indicated that
old habits within the executive branch about WPR implementation indeed die hard. Section 3 consultation was virtually non-existent as
congressional leaders were shuttled to the White House for a briefing
after the fact. Once again, the report to Congress was merely "consistent with the War Powers Resolution"48 and skirted section 4(a)(1)
requirements.
The presidential signature of the Lebanon War Powers Resolution
could have ushered in a new era of legislative-executive cooperation on
the decision to commit troops abroad. Instead, only thirteen days later,
the old pattern of evasive executive non-compliance had once again
appeared. In this instance, however, congressional oversight was more
vigorous than had been the case in tests of compliance under the Ford
and Carter Administrations.
While not casting judgment on the foreign policy merits of the
Grenadan invasion, both Houses of Congress attempted to trigger the
section 4(a)(1) requirements. In the House, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs approved by a vote of 33-2, House Joint Resolution 402, which
stated "that for purposes of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution,
the Congress hereby determines that the requirements of section 4(a)(1)
of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983,
when United States Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada. 49
In the Senate, an identical provision was approved in the form of an
amendment to the debt ceiling limitation by Senator Gary Hart. 50
Unfortunately, the Senate provision was dropped in the HouseSenate conference on the debt ceiling legislation and the Senate leader48. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, A REPORT ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO GRENADA, H.R. Doc. No. 125, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1
(1983).
49. H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H8697 (daily ed. Oct. 26,
1983). The Resolution was approved by a vote of 403-23. 129 CONG. REC. H8933-34 (daily
ed. Nov. 1, 1983).
50. Amend. No. 2462, 129 CONG. REC. S14,849 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983). The amendment was'adopted by a vote of 64-20. 129 CONG. REC. S14,874-77 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983).
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ship did not take up the House bill in the waning days of the session
before adjournment on November 18. Therefore, the President was not
confronted with the prospect of signing or vetoing legislation triggering
the section 5(b) requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming approval of identical provisions by
both the House and the Senate clearly seemed to play a major role in
the decision of Administration officials to remove United States combat
troops from Grenada by December 25, within the sixty day period prescribed by section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. The threat of
congressional action under the War Powers Resolution if troop withdrawals were not forthcoming demonstrated the effectiveness of the
Resolution in forcing collective decisions on troop commitment, even
in the face of executive noncompliance.
IV.

CONCLUSION-FuTuRE COURSE OF WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

IMPLEMENTATION

Three important points must be made about the first decade of
WPR implementation. First, the predictions that the Resolution would
weaken the nation's ability to react to foreign policy crises have been
proven unwarranted. In several instances where action to save American lives abroad was required, the President was able to act without
undue legal constraints. Even in the case where United States troops
were committed for clear foreign policy objectives, as in Lebanon and
Grenada, those objectives were pursued within the flexible collective
framework established by the Resolution.
Second, the Resolution has served to restore the balance in the
rights and responsibilities of the Congress and the President in the decision to commit troops. The executive branch cannot merely run roughshod over the Congress and must factor likely congressional insistence
or the Resolution's implementation in its foreign policy formulation,
particularly with respect to options involving military action. The Resolution is therefore a meaningful brake on military adventurism and
poorly-planned military actions, without serving as a handcuff on any
decision to commit troops.
Finally, the War Powers Resolution is a political fact of life. It
enjoys wide bipartism support and remains unamended and unchallenged in the Congress. Every successive administration regardless of
party affiliation has pledged to abide fully by its terms, although, as this
article has demonstrated, there has been more non-compliance than
compliance. As we enter the second decade of the Resolution, its
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evolution into an unquestioned fundamental law of the nation seems
certain.
This dctes not mean some changes in the Resolution's framework
may not be desirable at an appropriate political moment. If the executive branch is genuine in its desire to consult the Congress, structures to
establish orderly consultation under section 3 could be undertaken by
the Congress. Given executive reluctance to comply with section
4(a)(1), the Resolution may well have to be amended to compel the
President to specify which subsection of section 4 he is reporting to
Congress under, in a given situation. Such an amendment could eliminate clear presidential avoidance of section 4(a)(1) and therein the sixty
day requirements of section 5(b).
Such changes, however, would only improve an excellent-and
workable-product. The credibility of the War Powers Resolution as a
political tool for congressional oversight has never been higher. Furthermore, the experiences of Lebanon and Grenada have shown the
executive branch that decisions about clear-cut military deployment
will have to involve the legislative branch and that the vehicle for that
involvement will be the War Powers Resolution. The intent in section
2(a), that the collective judgment of the Congress and the President
apply to the commitment of troops into hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities is much closer to fulfillment ten years after the Resolution's passage than at its inception. The future points to only greater
fulfillment.

